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CHAPTER 7

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE
AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE
AREA AGREEMENT
Olabisi D Akinkugbe

1

INTRODUCTION

The conclusion of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free
Trade Area (AfCFTA)1 is in stark contrast to the uncertainty and current
retreat from multilateralism. The AfCFTA is a mega-regional trade agreement
that aims to create a single market for goods and services, and to facilitate
investment and the movement of persons in order to deepen economic
integration in Africa. The AfCFTA seeks to accelerate intra-African trade and
elevate Africa’s international economic relations in the multilateral trading
regime. In this regard, the AfCFTA represents a pan-African vision that aims
to unite African states as a regional trading bloc. The bloc is supposed to
strategically deploy its strength in international trade negotiations by creating
a competitive African market. At a time when confidence in the multilateral
trading regime is waning, with trade wars in some regions, African states,
perhaps more than ever, are embracing multilateralism. 2
Beyond the symbolic power of the AfCFTA, scholars have raised concerns
about the extent to which the AfCFTA truly engenders a fair, equitable and
radically different future for Africa. 3 Since colonisation, African states have
devolved into a hodgepodge of highly stratified economies with widening
inequalities. The deep-seated structural and socio-economic inequality and
power asymmetry among African states have most recently been revealed by

1

2
3

Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, in force 30 May 2019
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_
en.pdf (AfCFTA).
See Chapter 5 on decision making.
See generally Obeng‐Odom F ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area’ (2020) 79
(1) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 167–197; and Ajibo C ‘African
Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: The Euphoria, Pitfalls and Prospects’ (2019)
53 (5) Journal of World Trade 871–894.
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the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the long history of sub-regional economic
cooperation in Africa, vulnerabilities in Africa’s trade regimes persist.4 The
new institutions of the AfCFTA will be nestled in a complex regime of subregional economic communities (RECs) mostly reputed for their non-economic
agenda. It follows that below optimal performance of the institutions of
the RECs presents a unique challenge for the AfCFTA’s aspirations. Since
the AfCFTA increases the density of the fragmented sub-regional economic
institutions in Africa, it assumes even greater importance when examined in
the context of the many previous efforts among African states that have simply
failed. The failure of the past continental integration initiatives, as well as
the precarious struggle of the regional economic integration schemes to make
any meaningful economic impact, is a cause for concern vis-à-vis the rhetoric
of success that the conclusion of the AfCFTA has garnered. Regionally, the
eventual implementation of the AfCFTA will be embedded in a complex
regime of RECs and systemic deficiencies that have crippled the capacity of
African regional trade agreements to thrive economically. These dynamics and
the paradigm of trade alliances that emerge from them are important factors
with meaningful implications for the future of the AfCFTA.
Despite Africa’s fragmented sub-regional economic regimes, the AfCFTA
represents a significant moment for African states to harness the continent’s
international trade and investment opportunities on their own terms.
The AfCFTA initiates a set of complex and lengthy negotiations with a
view to reducing tariffs, galvanising industrial production, and boosting
Africa’s trade. The success of Africa’s reinvigorated liberal internationalism
embodied in the AfCFTA depends on a host of factors that primarily include
its effective implementation.
In this chapter, I situate the AfCFTA in the historical and contemporary
contexts of the mixed performance of RECs and other regimes in which its
implementation will be embedded. I also examine the pre-existing structural
deficiencies that the COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the fore and their
implications for the AfCFTA. Building on the foregoing, I further critically

4

For a discussion of such vulnerabilities, see Akinkugbe OD & Gammage C
‘Symposium Introduction: Vulnerabilities in the Trade and Investment Regimes in
the Age of COVID-19’ (18 August 2020) Afronomicslaw Blog Symposium https://
www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/08/18/symposium-introduction-vulnerabilities-inthe-trade-and-investment-regimes-in-the-age-of-covid-19/. The theme is discussed on
greater details in the forthcoming second issue of the African Journal of International
Economic Law (AfJIEL).
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examine the blind-spots of the pan-Africanist aspirations of the AfCFTA for
the future of the trade regime in Africa. Following this introduction, in the
second section, I examine the substantive provisions of the AfCFTA and its
institutions, focusing on the question of supranationality in the decision-making
process. In the third section, I deepen the chapter’s analysis by examining the
promise of the AfCFTA in the shadow of Africa’s mixed record of economic
cooperation. In the fourth section, I examine the systemic deficiencies in
African regional trade regimes, as impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. To
illustrate the latter, I draw on the finance sector-debt burden conundrum and
digitalisation. I selected the examples to illustrate areas where deep-seated
historical challenges exist and sectors emerge that African leaders should
capitalise upon for a better post-pandemic Africa. In the penultimate section,
I contend that a critical understanding of pan-Africanism in a morphological
sense that acknowledges its shortcomings is important to understanding the
attitude of African states to the lethargic implementation of regional trade
agreements. Operating with such consciousness, I argue, engenders a better
understanding of the intrigues of the implementation phase, as opposed to the
narrow, lack of political will arguments. I conclude the chapter in section 6.

2

OVERVIEW OF THE AFCFTA

The AfCFTA is the latest layer of agreement in Africa’s over half a century
experimentation with regional economic cooperation. Historically, the
AfCFTA builds on the aspirations of pan-Africanists and their visions for an
economically independent Africa. More recently, the AfCFTA constitutes one
of the goals on the continuum towards an African Economic Community, as
envisaged by the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (the
Abuja Treaty). 5 The achievement of the African Economic Community was
premised on the eight recognised RECs. Notably, at the heart of the AfCFTA
is the imperative of Africa’s industrialisation by building on sub-regional
economic integration. Thus, the AfCFTA is not a standalone project. It is

5

Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, Organization of African Unity,
3 June 1991, Abuja, Nigeria https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37636-treaty-0016_-_
treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_e.pdf; see generally Oppong R
‘The African Union, the African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic
Communities: Untangling a Complex Web’ (2010) 18 African Journal of International
and Comparative Law 92–103 92.
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anchored and complementary to other African Union (AU) initiatives for the
continent’s economic integration and development.
The AfCFTA is also connected with the AU’s Agenda 2063 as its first flagship
and a foundation on which to build Africa’s progress for the attainment of
the Sustainable Development Goals. Together with the Boosting Intra-African
Trade (BIAT) Action Plan, African leaders hope that the AfCFTA will address
the bottlenecks of intra-African trade by focusing on seven thematic areas:
trade policy reform, trade facilitation, productive capacity, trade-related
infrastructure, trade finance, trade information and factor market integration.
In this context, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) views the BIAT as a crucial policy for ‘minimizing the challenges
and maximising the gains of tariff and services liberalization’ so that African
states can harness the promise of the AfCFTA.6
The AfCFTA entered into force in May 2019 when the threshold for
operationalising the agreement was reached.7 Of the 55 AU members, 54 have
signed the AfCFTA8 and, by January 2021, 34 members had deposited the
instruments of ratification with the AU Commission. At the 2019 Niamey
Summit, African leaders launched five complementary initiatives that will
support the implementation of the AfCFTA.9 Trading under the AfCFTA,

6

7

8
9

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Digital Trade in Africa: Implications
for Inclusion and Human Rights (2017) https://www.uneca.org/archive/sites/default/
files/PublicationFiles/dthr_en_full_rev3.pdf 12.
See generally Luke D & MacLeod J ‘Bringing About Inclusive Trade in Africa with the
African Continental Free Trade Area’ in Luke D & MacLeod J (eds) Inclusive Trade
in Africa: The Africa Continental Free Trade in Comparative Perspective (2019) 1–4;
Gathii J ‘Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area’ (2019) 58
International Legal Materials 1028–1083; and AU & UNECA ‘African Continental
Free Trade Area, Updated Questions & Answers’ (January 2020) https://repository.
uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/43253/b11975106.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
Eritrea is the only country that has not signed the AfCFTA.
These are the AfCFTA product-specific rules of origin covering 90 per cent of tariff
lines; the Continental Online Mechanism for Monitoring, Reporting and Eliminating
Non-Tariff Barriers; the Pan-African Payments and Settlements System; the Online
Portal for Trade in Goods Tariffs Negotiations; and the AU Trade Observatory.
Addressing the summit, Afreximbank’s president Benedict Oramah said: ‘The PAPSS is
a platform that will domesticate intra-regional payments, save the continent more than
US$5bn in payment transaction costs per annum, formalise a significant proportion of
the estimated US$50bn of informal intra-African trade, and above all, contribute in
boosting intra-African trade’ (Wass S ‘Africa’s Continent-wide Payment and Settlement
System Launched’ (9 July 2019) Global Trade Review https://www.gtreview.com/news/
Africa/africas-continent-wide-payment-and-settlement-system-launched/).
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which was initially scheduled to commence on 1 July 2020, was post
poned to 1 January 2021 because of the disruptions occasioned by the
COVID-19 pandemic.10
The AfCFTA has a wide scope. It covers trade in goods and services,
investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy. The AfCFTA
has general and specific objectives. The general objectives are, inter alia, the
creation of a single market for goods, services, and the movement of persons
and investments among African countries; the creation of a liberalised market
for goods and services based on successive rounds of negotiations; laying
the foundation for the establishment of a Continental Customs Union; and
enhancing the competitiveness of the economies of African states, both
within the continent and the global market.11 Moreover, the AfCFTA aspires
towards a better coordination of African trade regimes and the elimination of
challenges associated with multiple and overlapping trade agreements across
the continent.12 The general objectives of the agreement also include socioeconomic development, gender equality and structural transformation of the
State Parties.13
The specific objectives mandate the parties to progressively eliminate
tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade in goods and liberalise trade
in services.14 State Parties shall cooperate on investment, intellectual property
10

11

12

13

14

See AU ‘Africa is Open for Business, Based on a Single Rule-Book for Trade and
Investment’ (9 September 2020) https://au.int/ar/node/39287; UNECA ‘African Union
Approves Start of Trading Under AfCFTA on 1 January Next Year as Earlier Agreed’
(5 December 2020) https://www.uneca.org/storys/african-union-approves-start-tra
ding-under-afcfta-1-january-next-year-earlier-agreed.
Article 3(h) of the AfCFTA provides that the general objectives of the AfCFTA include
the resolution of ‘the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite
the regional and continental integration processes’.
See generally Gathii J ‘African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes’
(2009) 35 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation
571–666; Busch M ‘Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement
in International Trade’ (2007) 61 (4) International Organization 735–761.
See Art 3(e) of the AfCFTA; on gender and gendering in regional economic integration
in Africa, see generally Gammage C & Momodu M ‘The Economic Empowerment of
Women in Africa: Regional Approaches to Gender Sensitive Trade Policies’ (2020) 1
African Journal of International Economic Law 1–40.
See Arts 4(a) and (b) of the AfCFTA; see also Simo R ‘Trade in Services in the African
Continental Free Trade Area: Prospects, Challenges and WTO Compatibility’ (2020) 23
(1) Journal of International Economic Law 65–95 (discussing the contribution of the
Protocol in Trade and Services in the achievement of an African Economic Community,
introducing the importance of services in both the developing and developed world and
justifying their inclusion in modern trade agreements like the AfCFTA).
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rights and competition policy,15 and establish a mechanism for the settlement of
disputes concerning their rights and obligations.16 The State Parties shall also
maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and administration
of the AfCFTA.17
While the objectives of the AfCFTA are clearly specified, the means by which
they will be achieved are unclear. Major prerequisites for trade liberalisation,
such as specific agreement on the products for which tariffs are to be reduced,
how far to reduce, and when to do so, as well as the rules of origin, are
yet to be finalised. The negotiation and agreement on the rules of origin in
particular is a sine qua non for any free trade agreement. Lack of agreed rules
of origin creates a loophole that third-country producers may exploit.18 The
outcome of the ongoing negotiations is therefore critical to the future of the
AfCFTA and its objectives.

3

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFCFTA

Although institutions of RECs in Africa are marked by a wide array of diversity,
a common thread that connects them all is their lacklustre performance.
Weak and ineffective institutions have been a challenge in regional economic
15

16

17
18

See Art 4(c) of the AfCFTA; see generally Büthe T & Kigwiru VK ‘The Spread of
Competition Law and Policy in Africa’ (2020) 1 African Journal of International
Economic Law 41–83 (taking stock of the status of competition laws and agencies at
the national and regional level in Africa by providing an overview of the history and
current state of competition law and policy); Adebola T ‘Mapping Africa’s Complex
Regimes: Towards an African Centred AfCFTA Intellectual Property (IP) Protocol’
(2020) 1 African Journal of International Economic Law 233–290 (comprehensively
mapping and analysing the fragmented intellectual property (IP) architecture in Africa
in light of the pending AfCFTA IP Protocol and arguing that it presents a timely, albeit
arduous, opportunity for Africa to reconstruct its broken IP architecture).
See Art 4(f) of the AfCFTA; see generally Akinkugbe OD ‘Dispute Settlement Under
the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment’
(2019) 28 (supplement) African Journal of International and Comparative Law
138–158 (examining the challenges of operationalising the AfCFTA’s dispute settlement
mechanism in the context of discontent with similar WTO-styled DSM in African
regional economic communities and international arbitration at the national level).
See Art 4(g) of the AfCFTA.
See UNCTAD Economic Development in Africa Report: Made in Africa – Rules of
Origin for Enhanced Intra-Africa Trade (26 June 2019) https://unctad.org/system/files/
official-document/aldcafrica2019_en.pdf. The edition focuses on the role of preferential
rules of origin in shaping the development of regional value chains in the AfCFTA with
a view to maximising gains from the area for structural transformation.
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integration. Trade agreements require effective institutions to oversee, promote
and monitor the implementation of obligations by their members. Effective
institutions are important drivers of a successful trade agreement.19
The institutional framework for the implementation, administration,
facilitation, monitoring and evaluation of the AfCFTA consists of the Assembly,
the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Senior Trade Officials and the
Secretariat. 20 The Assembly of the AU is the highest decision-making organ. 21
It provides oversight and strategic guidance on the AfCFTA, as well as BIAT.
The Assembly has exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the AfCFTA
on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. 22 The ‘involvement of the
Assembly ensures that the AfCFTA’s institutions are firmly within the circuit of,
and aligned with, the [AU] institutions under the supervision of the Assembly’. 23
The Council of Ministers is mandated to ensure the effective implementation
and enforcement of the agreement and, where necessary, take measures to
promote the objectives of the AfCFTA and associated instruments. 24 The
Council of Ministers will also collaborate with the relevant organs and
institutions of the AU and promote the harmonisation of appropriate policies,
strategies and measures for the effective implementation of the AfCFTA. 25
Article 11.5 of the AfCFTA provides that the decisions taken by the Council
of Ministers, while acting within its mandate, are binding on the parties. The
decisions that have legal, structural or financial implications become binding
upon their adoption by the Assembly. 26
The Secretariat of the AfCFTA will be a functionally autonomous
institutional body within the AU system with an independent legal personality. 27
The roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat shall be determined by the

19

20

21
22
23

24
25
26
27

See generally Kufuor KO The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community
of West African States (2006); and Steger D ‘Institutions for Regulatory Cooperation
in “New Generation” Economic and Trade Agreements’ (2012) 38 (4) Legal Issues of
Economic Integration 109–126.
Arts 9 and 12 of the AfCFTA expatiate of the composition and mandate of the Committee
of Senior Trade Officials. The Committee consists of Permanent or Principal Secretaries
or other officials designated by each State Party.
See Art 10(1) of the AfCFTA.
See Art 10(2) of the AfCFTA.
Sodipo B ‘Governance for an Effective AfCFTA’ in Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7)
120–133 120 121.
See Art 11(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the AfCFTA.
See Art 11(3)(d) and (e) of the AfCFTA.
See Art 11(5) of the AfCFTA.
See Art 13(3) of the AfCFTA.

07 International Economic Law CH07.indd 289

2021/08/11 5:52 AM

290

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW – (southern) African perspectives and priorities

Council of Ministers of Trade. 28 In February 2020, at the AU’s 33rd Ordinary
Session, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government elected its
inaugural Secretary-General, Mr Wamkele Mene. 29 The Secretary-General is
expected to provide leadership and technical support to the AfCFTA Secretariat
and overall management of the day-to-day functioning of the Secretariat.
Moreover, the Secretary-General will be responsible for the implementation of
the AfCFTA, including strategic collaborations, stakeholder engagement and
resource mobilisation. 30 The headquarters of the AfCFTA Secretariat are in
Accra, Ghana.
Outside of the governance mechanism, the Protocol on Dispute Settlement
provides the process and procedure for the settlement of disputes concerning
the rights and obligations of the parties to the AfCFTA.31 This dispute settle
ment mechanism is modelled on that of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
with the promise of certainty, predictability and a rules-based regime. Africa,
however, has various formal dispute settlement institutions existing in subregional communities. These existing structures include mediation or adversarial
institutions, such as courts or tribunals. The challenge with these sub-regional
dispute settlement institutions is that African states hardly resort to them for
the settlement of disputes.32 The question therefore is whether the dispute
settlement mechanism of the AfCFTA will be relevant for African states.33
The single market economy aspirations of the AfCFTA will not be achieved
without effectively strengthening the RECs that constitute its pillars. 34 A
nagging challenge with the institutions of the existing RECs in Africa is that
they lack supranational powers as they have largely been intergovernmental
institutions, unlike their counterparts in Europe. Supranational authorities are

28
29

30
31
32

33

34

See Art 13(6) of the AfCFTA.
See AU ‘Newly Sworn-In AfCFTA Secretary General, Wamkele Mene, Undertakes
to Serve Africa with Resolute Determination’ (18 April 2020) https://au.int/en/
pressreleases/20200418/newly-sworn-afcfta-secretary-general-wamkele-meneundertakes-serve-africa.
AU (2020) (n 29).
See Art 20(1)–(3) of the AfCFTA.
See generally Akinkugbe OD ‘Dispute Settlement Under the African Continental Free
Trade Area Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2019) 28 (supplement) African
Journal of International and Comparative Law 138–158.
See generally Maluwa T ‘The Peaceful Settlement of Dispute Among African States,
1963–1983: Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends’ (1989) 32 (2) International
& Comparative Law Quarterly 299–320.
See generally Bisong A ‘ECOWAS and the Role of the RECs in AfCFTA Implementation’
(2020) 9 (1) Great Insights 23–24.
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distinguished by their autonomy in decision making (in particular the rule of
the voting majority as opposed to consensus), the superiority of regional laws
and preclusion of members from enacting contradictory laws, ‘the institutional
autonomy of an organisation from its member states, and the direct binding
effect of laws emanating from regional organisations on natural and legal
persons in member states’. 35 The lack of supranational authority, particularly
with respect to the consensus decision-making process, is an impediment to
the implementation of trade and integration commitments of the AfCFTA. The
experience of African states so far has shown that the majoritarian approach
would be a more progressive route.
Seeking the appropriate balance between African countries’ sovereignty to
adopt economic policies in the interest of their nations, and the powers the
AfCFTA institutions require to operate in an effective and efficient manner
is central to the single community and overall economic and sustainable
development aspirations of the AfCFTA. One thing is clear: institutions matter.
The new institutions of the AfCFTA add to the spaghetti bowl of institutions
under the various RECs. It is too early to say whether these institutions will be
different in terms of charting a new course for trade liberalisation in Africa.
However, creating a convergence between the informal norms of African
regional economic integration and the formal rules will be critical to the
effectiveness of the institutions and therefore the AfCFTA. The formal rules
of trade institutions should be designed to achieve socially inclusive outcomes.
Likewise, they should address the trade concerns of the powerful and less
economically powerful members of the group alike. Whereas the design of
trade agreements tends to serve the interests of those with the bargaining
power to create new rules, in the African context, balancing the interests and
development of less economically endowed members is critical. 36
The AfCFTA envisions a rules-based trade liberalisation regime with a view
to creating a single market economy. Yet, the experience of the practices of
its members differs significantly. The general notion that law has prominence

35

36

Fagbayibo B ‘Common Problems Affecting Supranational Attempts in Africa: An Analytical
Overview’ (2013) 16 (1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse
Elektroniese Regsblad 31–69 33; see generally Fagbayibo B ‘Looking Back, Thinking
Forward: Understanding the Feasibility of Normative Supranationalism in the African
Union’ (2013) 20 (3) South African Journal of International Affairs 411–442.
See generally Drahos P ‘When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the
World Trade Organization’ (2003) 8 (1) International Negotiation 79–109; and Crystal J
‘Bargaining in the Negotiations over Liberalizing Trade in Services: Power, Reciprocity
and Learning’ (2003) 10 (3) Review of International Political Economy 552–578.
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over politics in the implementation phase of trade agreements has not been
true for African countries. The effectiveness of the AfCFTA institutions,
and by extension its single market economy aspiration, is dependent on the
convergence and alignment of the informal aspects of African regional economic
integration and the formal architecture enunciated in the AfCFTA. Wholesale
transplantation of the design of institutions of integration regimes from the
WTO is bound only to reinforce the ineffectiveness of African regional trade
regimes. 37 Therefore, variations that take account of local peculiarities in the
implementation of the legal institutions are important.
The formal rules of economic integration as enshrined in the AfCFTA and
the protocols are legitimised in practice only if the informal norms of African
economic integration are strategically empowered and aligned with the formal
approach. In other words, for the institutions of the AfCFTA, such as the
dispute settlement mechanism, to be effective, African leaders have to confront
and change the course of the divergence that has characterised the practice of
African economic integration.
The dream of an Africa We Want and a single market economy pursuant
to the AfCFTA is realistic only to the extent that each participating member
commits to a timely and effective enforcement of the rules and meaningful
support for the work of the institutions of the AfCFTA. As Kufuor notes,
formal and informal constraints interact to shape organisational paths. Once
on a given institutional path, an organisation’s decision-makers and interests
obtain advantage from the ‘increasing returns to the institutional matrix’
and, as a consequence institutions will endure notwithstanding whether they
are efficient or inefficient and even if there is an alternative path for the
organisation that is demonstrably more efficient. 38

In other words, there is a complex interaction between formal and informal
norms and rules of the behaviour of African states when it comes to regional
economic integration. Hence, understanding when and how informal norms of
African regional economic integration can reinforce formal institutions, and
vice versa, will be paramount to the success and effectiveness of the AfCFTA
in liberalising trade in Africa. 39
37

38

39

See generally Naldi J & Magliveras K ‘The African Economic Community: Emancipation
for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure’ (1998) 24 (3) North Carolina
Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulations 601–631.
Kufuor K The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West
African States (2006) 35.
See generally Acemoglu D & Johnson S ‘Unbundling Institutions’ (2005) 113 (5) Journal
of Political Economy 949–995.
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THE AFCFTA’S IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SHADOW OF
AFRICA’S MIXED RECORD OF REGIONAL TRADE REGIME

The implementation of the AfCFTA lies in the shadow of Africa’s mixed
record of economic cooperation. The choice of a mixed record as opposed to
failed regime is deliberate. Regionalism in Africa has both economic and noneconomic dimensions. It is a notorious fact that economic integration among
African states has been slow. Non-economic cooperation has however been more
successful. Failure narratives of African regional trade agreements do not make
these distinctions. The distinction is important because unnuanced assessments
of the performance of African regional trade agreements inadvertently affirm
the universality of the European Union approaches.40 African trade regimes
are heterogeneous and constituted by formal and informal economies with
a multidimensional economic and non-economic focus.41 Hence, I opt for
a nuanced understanding rather than universalising the failure of the trade
regimes. Accordingly, the mixed narrative acknowledges the modest progress
that sub-regional economic organisations have achieved.42
As previously highlighted, the promise of a single economic community
under the AfCFTA hinges on the RECs as its building blocks. Eight RECs
are recognised by the AU: the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD);43 the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU);44 the Intergovernmental Authority

40

41

42

43

44

For an analysis of the case for reconceptualising failure narratives in African court
regimes, see generally Akinkugbe OD ‘Revisiting the Economic Community of
West African States: A Socio-Legal Analysis’ (20 December 2017) Doctoral Thesis,
University of Ottawa https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3354070;
and Gathii J African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (2011).
See Akinkugbe OD ‘Theorizing Developmental Regionalism in Narratives of African
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)’ (2020) 1 African Journal of International
Economic Law 293–320 297.
See Ndomo A ‘Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progressive Overview’
(May 2009) TRALAC 5 https://www.tralac.org/images/News/Reports/Regional_
E conom ic _Com mu nities _ in _ A frica _ A _ Prog ress _Over view_ Atieno _ Ndomo _
GTZ_2009.pdf, arguing that ‘in terms of progress made in advancing the goals of
regional integration, the results are mixed with a general sense that there remain
substantial gaps in achievements. Although some RECs have made strides towards free
trade and a customs union, progress towards harmonised and integrated sub regional
markets is slow’.
Community of Sahel-Saharan States Revised Treaty, 16 February 2013 https://www.
nepad.org/file-download/download/public/14488.
Treaty Instituting the Arab Maghreb Union, 29 September 1989 https://www.wipo.int/
edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/amu/trt_amu.pdf.
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on Development (IGAD);45 the Southern African Development Community
(SADC);46 the East African Community (EAC);47 the Economic Community
of Central African States (ECCAS);48 the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA);49 and the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS). 50 SADC, EAC, ECCAS and COMESA, for instance, have
pursued different trade programmes within their regional blocs. Therefore,
they are at different stages of economic integration. Some of the obstacles that
are common to the RECs in their pursuit of an effective intra-regional trade
integration include policies that are informed by national interests, geo-political
contests and social conflicts, slow progress on the removal of NTBs, halfhearted commitment to the freedom of movement of persons and goods across
regional borders, ill-attention to the plight of informal cross-border trade, and
an underdeveloped infrastructure that amplifies the costs of intra-regional
trade. The reasons that the economic gains have not translated into substantive
growth are colonial and post-colonial in nature. They are colonial in the sense
that African states were created into a structure of international economic
inequality that pauperise their economic endowments through economic policy
measures adopted in the global economic regime. For example, the position of
many African states mainly as commodities suppliers and as highly vulnerable
to fluctuations in international markets has contributed to the affirmation
of global patterns of inequality. 51 In the post-colonial era, while the unequal
economic structure remains, physical infrastructure challenges, ineffective
trade policies at the regional level, and the lack of political will among African
leaders have contributed to the poor economic performance of the formal
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Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development,
21 March 1996 http://www.kenyalaw.org.
Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community,
21 October 2015 https://www.sadc.int/files/5314/4559/5701/Consolidated_Text_of_
the_SADC_Treaty_-_scanned_21_October_2015.pdf.
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999 https://www.eacj.
org/?page_id=33.
Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States, October 1983
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/eccas/trt_eccas.pdf.
Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 1993 https://
www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Comesa-Treaty.pdf.
Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, 24 July 1993
https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-law/treaties/.
See generally Deaton A ‘Commodity Prices and Growth in Africa’ (1999) 13 (3) Journal
of Economic Perspectives 23–40.
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regional trade regimes. With these challenges continuing unabated, trading
with states outside Africa has thrived to the detriment of intra-regional trade.
Furthermore, the experience in sub-regional organisations reveals that
African states prioritise national economic development policies over regional
ones. Regional trade policies are frequently subverted by a combination of the
slow or incomplete domestication of regional commitments. The delay in the
ratification of the AfCFTA by the parliaments of some African states illustrates
this problem. 52 However, while the enthusiasm about the coming into force
of the AfCFTA has been encouraging, navigating an accelerated economic
integration agenda that centres Africa’s interests presents more formidable
political, economic, legal and functional/institutional challenges. 53
In this regard, the AfCFTA’s proposal to build on the RECs without providing
a specific plan of how to do so is at best murky and aspirational. Disentangling
the complex web of RECs in Africa for the implementation of the AfCFTA
is critical to the success of the agreement. It is not enough that the AfCFTA
proposes to build on the acquis of the RECs. The lack of trust and colonial
divisions between Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone countries will
simply be extended into the AfCFTA’s implementation process. A possibility that
may ensue is a reproduction of the impediments that the RECs have experienced.
The increasing number of scholarly assessments of the AfCFTA promise
are both optimistic and sceptical. On paper, both optimists and sceptics
recognise the promise of the AfCFTA to transform the economic development
struggles of African states in pursuit of a meaningful and substantive
industrialisation agenda.
The optimistic view is championed mostly by institutional actors and
representatives. For understandable reasons, they touted the win-win nature
of the agreement. However, the extent to which a trade agreement equalises
the relationship of the participating states is questionable. The African states
comprise developing and least-developed countries (LDCs). The likelihood that
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Nigeria, among a bouquet of other countries, would have missed the official
commencement trading date of 1 July 2020, but for the postponement due to the
COVID-19 pandemic (see Adegboyega A ‘Nigeria Set to Ratify AfCFTA Agreement
– Minister’ (22 September 2020) Premium Times https://www.premiumtimesng.com/
business/416280-nigeria-set-to-ratify-afcfta-agreement-minister.html.
See UNCTAD African Continental Free Trade Area: Advancing Pan-African Integration
– Some Considerations UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/5 (2016) 1–21 https://unctad.org/
webflyer/african-continental-free-trade-area-advancing-pan-african-integration-someconsiderations (providing an overview of the opportunities and challenges for African
continental economic integration through the AfCFTA).
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the AfCFTA will benefit the more economically endowed members is high. Luke
and MacLeod argue that the ‘AfCFTA is win-win for all African countries’. 54
Their argument is predicated on the flexibility and variable geometry principles
of the AfCFTA. In Luke and MacLeod’s view, industrialised African countries
will gain from the opportunities for manufactured products, while the lessindustrialised countries can derive their benefit from linking to the regional
value chains. 55 Agricultural producing countries will gain from producing food
for Africa’s food security, while the benefits arising from reduced tariffs, trade
facilitation and customs cooperation should alleviate the predicament of landlocked African states. The LDCs can take advantage of programmes such as
the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa56 and educational and skills
training courses to address their concerns. 57 The challenge, however, is that the
RECs have not been able to translate these flexibilities into substantive intraAfrican trade and economic development.
The sceptics, however, diverge on the substantive capacity of the AfCFTA to
achieve the goals without addressing, at least simultaneously, some of the urgent
pre-existing impediments. Critics of the AfCFTA argue that the perennial
challenges of regional trade agreements and cooperation in Africa must be
addressed for its promise to be realised. Ajibo argues that to optimise effective
trading in goods and services, the AfCFTA will need to address deficiencies in
technical capacity, financial resources, physical infrastructure, the elimination
of non-tariff measures, and will have to create a reliable remedies regime. 58 More
pointedly, in assessing the promise of the AfCFTA to address the plight of the
LDCs in Africa, Ndonga, Laryea and Chaponda contend that the AfCFTA ‘does
not and cannot address many other problems that beset African international
trade performances, such as poor infrastructure and low production and
productivity’. 59 They argue that, to maximise the potential of the AfCFTA,
54
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Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7) 1 10.
See Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7).
See Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa, Ex.CL/379 (XII)
Annex II, AU https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/documents/30985-doc-plan_
of_action_of_aida.pdf.
See Luke & Macleod (2019) (n 7) 1 10.
See Ajibo (2019) (n 3) 873.
Ndonga D, Laryea E & Chaponda M ‘Assessing the Potential Impact of the African
Continental Free Trade Area on Least Developed Countries: A Case Study of Malawi’
(2020) 46 (4) Journal of Southern African Studies 773–792 779 (analysing questions
such as whether the AfCFTA trade benefits will accrue evenly to Africa’s diverse
economies and how the agreement’s provisions will affect the economies that have a
fiscal dependence on trade taxes).
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African states must pivot from patterns of trading and national economic
policies, and invest in physical infrastructure that opens up new opportunities
for Africa. Likewise, extant physical infrastructures, particularly the road and
rail routes of trading, entrench colonial trading patterns. To a limited extent, the
regional development corridor projects that some of the RECs have implemented
are aimed at addressing this challenge. However, the geographical spread of
the programmes requires a wider expansion. Obegon-Odoom, also a sceptic,
argues that the AfCFTA lacks the capacity to re-engineer a redistribution of
private legal and economic ordering.60 His scepticism stems from the fact that
the AfCFTA shows ‘little concern with staggering inequality and debt crises on
the continent, and [despite its attention to economic growth and development,
the AFCFTA] … may contribute to impending ecological crises’.61
In other words, in its current form, the AfCFTA does not adequately
address how the inequality and distributional effects, particularly as they
relate to the informal economy and LDCs, will be addressed. If the gains are
perceived as being captured by only a few countries, there may be a backlash
for the AfCFTA in the implementation phase. Article 5 of AfCFTA, inter alia,
incorporates principles such as variable geometry,62 flexibility and special and
differential treatment (S&DT), and the preservation of the acquis.63 Flexibility,
S&DT and variable geometry are embedded in the AfCFTA.64 In my view,
while these principles are useful and might address some challenges relating to
different levels of development, African leaders need to pay far more attention
to the plight of the most vulnerable African states. Development-centred
projects that will augment and enhance the job security of the women and men
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Obeng‐Odom (2020) (n 3) 168; Udombana NJ ‘A Step Closer: Economic Integration and
the African Continental Free Trade Area’ (2020) 31 (1) Duke Journal of Comparative
& International Law 1–89.
Obeng‐Odom (2020) (n 3) 168.
For different takes on the contentious implication of this principle for African
economic integration, see Tino E ‘The Variable Geometry in the Experience of
Regional Organizations in Developing Countries’ (2013-2014) 18 Spanish Yearbook of
International Law 141–162; and Gathii (2011) (n 40).
See Gérout G, MacLeod J & Desta M ‘The AfCFTA As Yet Another Experiment
Towards Continental Integration: Retrospect and Prospect’ in Luke & MacLeod (2019)
(n 7) 15–34 26; Sommer L & McLeod J ‘How Important is Special and Differential
Treatment for an Inclusive AfCFTA’ in Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7) 69–86; and
Kuhlmann K & Agutu A ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area: Toward a New
Legal Model for Trade and Development’ (2020) 51 (4) Georgetown Journal of Inter
national Law.
See Art 5 of the AfCFTA.

07 International Economic Law CH07.indd 297

2021/08/11 5:52 AM

298

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW – (southern) African perspectives and priorities

that operate in the informal cross-border trade in Africa must be prioritised.
More precisely, to drive the implementation of the AfCFTA, it is critical to
align national interests with regional objectives. In this context, it is essential
to gain the trust and buy-in of the majority of the parties in negotiations on
NTBs, rules of origin, investment, cross-border movement of persons, services
liberalisation and regulation, and trade remedies. We should not conflate the
overwhelming support for the adoption and coming into force of the AfCFTA
with its implementation. The real challenge that the promise of a rules-based
liberalised trade regime under the AfCFTA will have to surmount is African
states’ implementation lethargy. As it stands, without addressing this as a
preliminary step to the other challenges discussed in this section, the AfCFTA
may not transcend the shadow of the RECs.

5

SYSTEMIC DEFICIENCIES AND THE AFCFTA IN THE
POST-PANDEMIC ERA

On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared
COVID-19 a pandemic, formally signalling its threat to every country in the
world.65 COVID-19 has revealed the fragility of African states in the global
economic order. The pandemic and the responses to it by states have brought
into sharp focus different dimensions of the socio-political and economic
realities of regional economic cooperation in Africa and vis-à-vis the multilateral
trading system. It has revealed different dimensions of Africa’s international
economic relations, both in the context of its South-South relations on the
one hand, and the Global North on the other. Unlike their Global NorthGlobal South partnerships, South-South cooperation, on the face of it, builds
on solidarity, trust and reciprocity. These underlying principles are not without
their own challenges. Economic cooperation between Global South countries
also manifests structural inequalities. The COVID-19 pandemic has further
exacerbated these structural inequalities and power asymmetry.66
65

66

See World Health Organization ‘WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the
Media Briefing on COVID-19’ (11 March 2020) https://www.who.int/director-general/
speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-oncovid-19---11-march-2020 (‘COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic’).
See Akinkugbe OD & Gammage C ‘COVID-19 and South-South Trade & Investment
Cooperation: Three Emerging Narratives’ (11 May 2020) Afronomicslaw https://
www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/05/11/covid-19-and-south-south-trade-investmentcooperation-three-emerging-narratives/, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic could
generate three narratives: ‘The first narrative is pessimistic in its outlook – the “worst
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Africa was already in a weak and vulnerable position in the international
economic regime before the COVID-19 pandemic. The vulnerability status of
the marginalised African states in international economic law is not simply
a consequence of this pandemic.67 It was and is a question of the historical
inequality, structure of dominance, power asymmetry and its reproduction in
the international economic law regime that is skewed in favour of the Global
North. Thus, as Africa has always been at the periphery of the international
economic order, the pandemic has ‘brought to the fore and made more realistic,
and quite unfortunately, the plight of the marginalized [African states] in our
largely unequal multilateral trading regime’.68 Specifically, the pandemic has
led to a slowdown in trade, investment inflows, tourism and service sectors in
Africa’s fragile economies. It has left, in its wake, financial distress and rising
debt, a breakdown in social services, the erosion of trust, the rise of protectionist
measures, and deepened inequality and vulnerability. In addition to the
challenges caused by a sharp decline in external trade and investment due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, many African states plunged into an unforeseen socioeconomic crisis resulting from the lockdowns enforced by their governments.69
At the regional level, the pandemic has slowed the pace of the AfCFTA’s
operational phase. It led to the postponement of the commencement of trading
from 1 July 2020 to 1 January 2021. The lockdowns affected the ongoing
negotiations relating to the rules of origin and NTBs that were important
for the AfCFTA to commence. The pandemic has thus had a direct effect
on formal economic integration and intra-African trade.70 Likewise, the
health-related consequences of the pandemic have economic consequences.71
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71

case” scenario of a post-Covid 19 world that will be characterised by deeper divisions
and inequalities among and within countries’; ‘the second narrative of South-South
cooperation is more optimistic in terms of its outcomes’; and ‘the third narrative
navigating murky terrain where the winners and losers of the post-Covid 19 era are
difficult to identify’.
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Trade and Vulnerability’
(16 September 2019) UNCTAD Secretariat https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/cid48_en.pdf.
Akinkugbe & Gammage (2020) (n 66).
The WTO projected a decline in world trade between 13 per cent and 32 per cent in
2020; see WTO ‘PRESS/855’ (2020) https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/
pr855_e.htm.
See Gondwe G ‘Assessing the Impact of COVID-19 on Africa’s Economic Development’
(2020) 3 UNCTAD/ALDC/MISC/2020/3 https://unctad.org/system/files/official-docu
ment/aldcmisc2020d3_en.pdf.
See Sirleaf M ‘Africa, COVID-19 and Responsibility’ (12 May 2020) Afronomicslaw
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/05/12/africa-covid-19-and-responsibility/.
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Economic measures, particularly border closures, protectionist policies and a
breakdown in the global and regional supply chain, have produced significant
setbacks for African economies mainly in terms of lost productivity and trade
both within and among countries. To illustrate COVID-19’s impact on trade
in Africa, I use examples of the financial sector-debt burden conundrum and
digitalisation. The first constitutes an area where historical and contemporary
deep-seated challenges exist, and the second is an emerging sector that African
leaders can capitalise on for a better post-pandemic Africa.
Financing Africa’s economy and the problem it has engendered historically
is a critical aspect of the problems of economic cooperation that the pandemic
has brought to the fore. In the context of the AfCFTA, the debt profile of many
African states exposes their weak financial status, as well as their dependency
on external loans to finance their economies. The debt profile of many African
states is a significant constraint on their liquidity capacity to implement
economic measures with a direct impact on trade. From 2011 to 2019, the
average debt-to-GDP ratio of African states increased from 39,5 per cent to
61,3 per cent.72 However, African states remained highly indebted. The rise in
debt has limited the fiscal space to respond adequately to the pandemic due to
a series of factors that include but are not limited to ‘low domestic saving rates;
low levels of domestic resource mobilization; high illicit financial outflows;
capital flight; volatile commodity prices; high fiscal deficits and stagnating
official developing assistance’.73 Proposals to deal with the attendant debt
burden for low-income countries include the International Monetary Fund’s
Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust74 and the Debt Service Suspension
Initiative 75.76 The proposals are, however, a stop gap that does not address the
broader systemic issues of inequality and structural asymmetries that created

72

73

74

75

76

See UNCTAD Press Release ‘Secretary-General Says Tackling “Crushing Debt” Central
to COVID-19 Responses, at Joint Meeting of Global Financial Bodies’ (17 April 2020)
Doc SG/SM/20049 https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20049.doc.htm.
UNECA, AU & African Development Bank Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area
About: Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII (2020) 17 https://repository.
uneca.org/ds2/stream/?#/documents/6eecec71-b7f3-5f3f-b853-5e9bfae14955/page/1.
See International Monetary Fund ‘Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust’
(15 April 2020) https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/49/
Catastrophe-Containment-and-Relief-Trust.
See World Bank ‘COVID-19: Debt Service Suspension Initiative’ (21 December 2020)
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspensioninitiative.
See Connelly S, Tassis C, Patricio Fereirra Lima K & Connelly S ‘Staying Claims: Debt
Moratoria Beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative’ (6 August 2020) Afronomicslaw
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the initial problem. Bradlow has warned that the current debt arrangement
has the potential to encourage vultures who may capitalise on this moment
for profit and therefore entrench the debt problems of African states.77 The
point here is that Africa’s debt profile amplifies the urgent need for economic
diversification and eventual transformation. Whilst debt issues linger and are
being addressed, the AfCFTA as a vehicle for economic transformation must be
implemented in a manner that diversifies Africa’s mostly monolithic economies.
Hence, while in a post-pandemic world African states will require a reasonable
level of flexibility in capital to ensure that they have the necessary finance to
stabilise their economies, the AfCFTA must be instrumentalised in innovative
ways to galvanise and reposition these economies for a better future.
Another consideration is that the pandemic has accelerated the absorption
of digital solutions, tools and services, and their adaptation for the purposes
of trade.78 E-commerce is on the rise in Africa, and with it have come new
opportunities for market expansion and investment in the digital economy.
Digital economies hold the promise of transformation of trade and services
in Africa in unique ways that complement and innovatively expand trade in
Africa. An increasing amount of e-commerce in Africa involves cross-border
sales and therefore contributes to international trade. Many African countries
have actively deployed digital technologies to shift to cashless transactions.
Likely, digital solutions have been used to manage the spread of the pandemic in
Africa. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the
use of mobile money in East Africa has helped to reduce the risk of the spread
while in Ethiopia and Senegal, tech start-ups are using 3D printing to develop
face shields and ventilator valves.79 The point here is that financial inclusion
driven by the digital revolution to foster market integration and production
activities may be achieved at a much lower transaction cost. Similarly, the
widespread availability of mobile telephone internet portends well for a greater
number of participants in the digital economy. In particular, farmers have found
digital platforms useful in boosting agricultural productivity through prompt
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https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/08/06/staying-claims-debt-moratoria-beyond-thedebt-service-suspension-initiative/.
See Bradlow D ‘Dove, Vultures and African Debt in the Time of COVID-19’ (22 May
2020) Afronomicslaw https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/05/22/doves-vultures-andafrican-debt-in-the-time-of-covid-19/.
See UNECA ‘Impact of COVID-19 in Africa’ (20 May 2020) UNECA Policy Brief
https://www.uneca.org/archive/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/sg_policy_brief_on_
covid-19_impact_on_africa_may_2020.pdf.
UNECA (2020) (n 78) 8.
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payments for produce, information sharing and agro-industrial activities.80 In
the COVID-19 era, the use of technology has become not only increasingly
important but also the primary means by which smallholder farmers exchange
information and access to resources.81 Further, the AU has adopted digitisation
to drive the negotiation of the AfCFTA through the African Virtual TradeDiplomacy Platform (AVDP) as part of the wider African Virtual Resilient
Integration for a Vibrant Africa (AVRIVA).82 To effectively harness digital
platforms for the AfCFTA, among other emerging digital solutions, the AU
identifies the following three key interventions: (i) the establishment of a
pan-African technology platform and digitisation of the bio-surveillance and
bio-screening protocols of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and
Prevention; (ii) the design and deployment of a technology framework for
aligning e-commerce and e-trading platforms; and (iii) a broad initiative to
enhance cybersecurity in multilateral affairs in Africa.83
Digitisation is, however, not value-neutral. Digital solutions are adopted
and applied in an already stratified economy.84 Maximising the full potential
of the digital revolution requires an acknowledgement of the challenges and
taking appropriate steps to address them. Digitisation in service of trade and
integration must be implemented to reflect equitable, inclusive and sustainable
economic expansion in Africa. In the context of the AfCFTA, Sucker argues
that the potential to harness the benefits of the digital sector would only be
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See Abdulai A, Duncan E & Fraser E ‘How Digital Technologies Can Help Africa’s
Smallholder Farmers’ (29 July 2019) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations
http://www.fao.org/e-agriculture/blog/how-digital-technologies-can-helpafrica’s-smallholder-farmers. In relation to farming, digitisation refers to ‘everything
from delivering farming advice via text messaging to interactive voice response. It also
includes smart phone applications that link farmers to multimedia advisory context,
farm inputs, and buyers. And it covers the use of drones and satellite systems to inform
farmer activities, such as crops and times to plant; and types and amounts of inputs to
use’. (Abdulai et al 2019) (n 80)).
See Browner M ‘How Technology Powers Smallholder Farmers During COVID-19’
(25 September 2020) Global Citizen https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/howtechnology-powers-smallholder-farmers/.
See AU ‘In Wake of COVID-19, African Union to Keep AfCFTA on Track with Digital
Technology’ (14 August 2020) https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200814/covid-19african-union-keep-afcfta-track-digital-technology.
AU (2020) (n 82).
See Sucker F ‘COVID-19 Pushes Digital Solutions and Deepens Digital Divides: What
Role for African Digital Trade Law?’ (9 May 2020) Afronomicslaw https://www.
afronomicslaw.org/2020/05/09/covid-19-pushes-digital-solutions-and-deepens-digitaldivides-what-role-for-african-digital-trade-law/.
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realised if ‘an additional AfCFTA-protocol with specific provisions on cross
border e-commerce are expanded to focus more broadly on cross border
digital trade’. Such an approach, Sucker contends, ‘would not only capture
the sale of consumer products via the Internet and digitally supplied services
… but also data flows that enable global value chains, services that enable
smart manufacturing, digital content not stored on a physical carriers … and
numerous other platforms and applications’.85
While the pandemic may have shown deep and systemic deficiencies and
vulnerabilities for many African countries, policy lessons can also inform
future pathways to strengthen the trade regime in Africa. With the promise of
opportunities for new trade exports, jobs, investments in infrastructure and
financing for Africa’s development, the AfCFTA has a crucial role to play in
diversifying African economies and protecting them against future harm or
volatilities that shape the global commodity prices that constitute the majority
of Africa’s foreign trade. In other words, the pause in the negotiations for phase
II of the AfCFTA presents an opportunity for African countries to re-assess
the potential impact of a prolonged delay and revisit the areas that COVID-19
has revealed as Africa’s strengths and weaknesses. It is imperative that African
leaders embrace an unwavering commitment to re-engineer African economies
through the AfCFTA for a sustainable and relevant industrial future.86
COVID-19 has reminded us that, in the face of emergencies, national autonomy
will be reasserted against regional integration objectives. African countries
are not alone in this realisation.87 We are reminded that international trade is
not a silver bullet for prosperity and that in the context of the AfCFTA, the
journey to realising its objectives depends on several layers of socio-political,
economic, cultural and institutional factors.

6

CONTENDING VISIONS OF PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE
FUTURE OF THE AFCFTA

The AfCFTA has been touted as a pan-African trade agreement. However,
it remains unclear what this assertion means. Abrahamsen’s analysis of the
contending visions of the ideology of pan-Africanism offers a compelling fluid,
85
86
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Sucker (2020) (n 84).
See Desta M ‘Covid-19 and Export Restrictions: The Limits of International Trade
Law and Lessons for the AfCFTA’ (May 2020) Africa Trade Policy Centre, UNECA
https://repository.uneca.org/ds2/stream/?#/documents/cadd8f0c-cc81-4887-b98a5e6b6975b91c/page/1.
See Desta (2020) (n 86).
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overlapping and morphological understanding of pan-Africanism, which is
instructive to understanding the future of the AfCFTA in the implementation
phase.88 Therefore, my aim is not to examine the concept in its historical
evolution. The majority of scholars describe the attitude of African states
towards non-implementation as a lack of political will. In my view, this
oversimplifies the movements that occur in the implementation phase.89
In signalling a pan-Africanist underpinning, the AfCFTA gives an idea
that a pan-African trade agreement is unifying and perhaps monolithic.90
Pan-Africanism, Abrahamsen argues, ‘contains internal tensions and fissures,
multiple variations and inflections, all adapting and mutating in interaction
with global events’.91 In other words, not only is pan-Africanism not value
neutral, its meaning at any point in time is constituted by interactions with
prevailing ideologues in the international economic order. Abrahamsen
identifies overlapping ideas and building blocks for her analysis of
contending and evolving visions of world order within Pan-Africanism: a
world of racially defined units; a world of continental unity and transnational
solidarity; and a world of national sovereignty.
…
morphological perspective that recognises Pan-Africanism as capable of
multiple conceptual combinations and nuanced variations, offering different
and varied decontestations of unity – depending on how it is conjugated
in relation to the desire and demand for other political ends, most notably
sovereignty and equality, and correlated with world events and historical
circumstances.92
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See Abrahamsen R ‘Internationalists, Sovereignties, Nativists: Contending Visions of
World Order in Pan-Africanism’ (2020) 46 (1) Review of International Studies 56–74 57.
See eg Kufuor K ‘When Two Leviathans Clash: Free Movement of Persons in ECOWAS
and the Ghana Investment Act of 1994’ (2013) 6 (1) African Journal of Legal Studies
1–16 (analysing the problems that arise in ‘reconciling ECOWAS’ supranationalism
with the domestic interests of its members that is played out in the on-going bout of
protectionism currently existing in Ghana, related primarily to the right of Nigerian
citizens to establish themselves in Ghana’s markets and engage in what is known as
petty trading’. (Kufuor (2013) 2).
See Nanga J ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area: Free Trade and Pan-Africanism’
(1 January 2019) Bilaterals https://www.bilaterals.org/?the-african-continental-free-trade.
Abrahamsen (2020) (n 88) 57.
Abrahamsen (2020) (n 88) 57–58. ‘Pan-Africanism today relates and responds to the ideas
and forces that give rise to widespread anxieties over a vanishing liberal internationalism,
including the spread of nationalism, the withdrawal from multilateralism, and the
emergence of illiberal powers like China and Russia.’ (Abrahamsen (2020) 61).
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My argument here is a simple one: African regional trade regimes in general,
and the AfCFTA project in particular, have paid insufficient attention to
the mutability and fluidity of pan-Africanism in the discourses of economic
cooperation in Africa, especially in the implementation phase of the trade
agreements. A reasonable body of literature that analyses the AfCFTA as
a pan-African project tends to equate this loosely with a convergence with
national economic policies or objectives. To be sure, Pan-Africanism is useful
and ‘contains valuable intellectual and political resources for the defence,
reinvigoration, and invention of a more just, rule-bound multilateral world
order, but that this cannot be taken for granted’.93
Nigeria’s stop and start relationship offers a good example to illustrate
the argument that pan-Africanism is fluid and mutable and evolving vis-àvis each state party as opposed to a united African states’ position about
the ideology. In the context of the AfCFTA, having been at the forefront of
negotiating the AfCFTA, Nigeria’s initial delay in signing the agreement took
many by surprise. However, at the heart of the decision were national concerns
championed mostly by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN).94
The non-competitiveness of small and medium-sized Nigerian companies visa-vis the transnational companies, MAN argues, will inevitably be a factor in
the bankruptcy of these companies, the consequent job losses and the growth
of unemployment.95 As such, it was wise to delay the decision to address the
national contestations regarding the AfCFTA.
Pan-Africanist ideologies do not abate after the agreement becomes
operational. Its effect in one form or a combination of the three visions
described above inform the behaviour of African states in the implementation
of the AfCFTA. The future of the AfCFTA and its implementation will do
well recognising that what appears as a lack of political will, in the context of
an economic objective, may be a manifestation of the underlying contending
national, sub-regional and regional visions. Perhaps working with such a
nuanced and critical understanding would engender new attitudes towards the
underlying challenges for the members. Such an approach, in fact, complements
the flexibilities that are codified in the AfCFTA.
93
94

95

Abrahamsen (2020) (n 88) 73.
See Adekoya F ‘MAN Kicks as Nigeria’s Priority Products are Omitted from AfCFTA’s
Sensitive, Exclusive Lists’ (24 February 2020) The Guardian https://guardian.ng/
business-services/man-kicks-as-nigerias-priority-products-are-omitted-from-afcftassensitive-exclusive-lists/.
See Okwumbu R ‘AfCFTA: Nigeria not Ready for Restrictive Rule of Origin’ (30 July
2020) Nairametrics https://nairametrics.com/2020/07/30/afcfta-nigeria-is-not-readyfor-restrictive-rule-of-origin/.
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CONCLUSION

The project of trade liberalisation in the context of African societies and
economic integration cannot be disentangled from the broader question of
economic development. The implementation of successful trade agreements,
particularly those with economic development projects embedded in them,
entails an understanding of the complex socio-political, economic, legal and
institutional factors at play.96 With trade wars raging in some regions97 and the
rise of populist and anti-free trade agendas in erstwhile pro-trade countries,98
confidence in the multilateral trading regime and the architecture of economic
order it promises has experienced a significant fracture.
The case has been made extensively for the AfCFTA and its potential to
restructure international economic law in Africa. To the extent that African leaders
sought with minimal success for a continental, regional integration scheme, the
AfCFTA already ticks an important box.99 The recognition of flexible regimes
via S&DT provisions in acknowledgement of the unequal economic position of
African states bodes well for an inclusive AfCFTA. Yet, challenges remain.
An important factor that the policy experts, academics and negotiators of the
AfCFTA must bear in mind is that its implementation must not be severed from
the historical, social, economic, political and cultural realities of the continent.
Even as it aims to construct a new continental economic order, it must not
only capture the socio-political system that has aided the dominant economic
actors, but also, extend to the informal economy – consisting mostly of women
and traders routinely trading across the borders – that strongly underpins
African societies. The regulation of the formal and informal economies, when
joined with the potential of the continent in information technology, holds the
promise of an unprecedented leveraging of capital and resources that bodes
well for the future of the continent. Lessons and experiences from the RECs
will be indispensable in this process.
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See generally Herbst J ‘Crafting Regional Cooperation in Africa’ in Acharya A &
Johnston A Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative
perspective (2009) 129–144.
See generally Van Aaken A, Bown C & Lang A ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on
“Trade Wars”’ (2019) 22 (4) Journal of International Economic Law 529–533.
See generally Lester S & Manak I ‘The Rise of Populist Nationalism and the Renegotiation
of NAFTA’ (2018) 21 (1) Journal of International Economic Law 151–169.
On this, see Luke & MacLeod (2019) (n 7) 2: ‘AfCFTA negotiators surpassed expectations
with the pace with which the negotiations were accomplished … the texts of the AfCFTA
Agreement and its Protocols on Trade in Goods, Trade in Services and on Rules and
Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, were concluded in less than three years’.
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